

"THE LAWRENCE RIOTS: MEANING AND ACTION."

3.0 Introduction to the chapter.

This chapter will focus on some of the intergovernmental action -responses to the riots. It will also highlight some of the perceived contradictions of these action-responses from the community-level perspective.

In the following chapter, I will offer my 'impressionistic' analysis of this complex set of intergovernmental processes. Additionally, I will advocate a distinct planning relationship which may respond to the perceived contradictions of these intergovernmental processes and the action-responses which emerge from them.

In Chapter Five, I will draw our attention to the complexities and perceived contradictions within the community context; particularly among the Hispanic community's action-responses to the riots. The discussion will culminate with an attempt to identify the elements which may facilitate or inhibit the dynamic interaction between the intergovernmental and community contexts.

3.1 What's in a word: Riot.

3.3.0 How stories will be discussed.

In the 54 interviews I conducted for this thesis, involving close to 175 people, no one word seemed to elicit greater variations among informant responses than the word: "riot." The following stories will be examined first as the riots are interpreted from the intergovernmental and community level. Second, the stories

will be used to describe two key intergovernmental action-responses to the riots: legislation and executive action. Third, the stories selected here will offer some community-level perceptions of the intergovernmental action-responses.

The discrepancies perceived between meaning (official and community interpretations) and action (intergovernmental responses) will provide the basis for assessing the potential form and content of Hispanic mobilization; the subject of the final chapter.

### 3.3.1 Official (intergovernmental) interpretations.

The Mayor of the City of Lawrence, John Buckley, states that the riots "were just an isolated incident...over nothing important...it was a hot night and tempers were high....things just got away from themselves." (Boston Globe, August 10, 1985).

A city alderman dismissed the riots as "just an opportunity for those hot-blooded Latins to blow off some steam....once they get it out of their system they cool off."

Kevin Blanchette, House Representative from Lawrence, stated to me: "I think the factors that lead to the riots had to do with a sense of frustration toward the system....poverty, poor housing conditions, unemployment, drugs, and criminality. The riots came out of a sense of alienation. For years the City of Lawrence has been a closed shop...people are fed up with the lack of access to decision-making in city government and policy-setting...the riots broke out because they didn't know what else to do."

He continues: "I hold the City of Lawrence civilly responsible and negligent for the escalation of the riots....this is the city government that has been deaf to the cries of its citizens

(referring specifically to Hispanics) to whom they ought to be more responsive...During the riots, I and Jim Shannon charged into the city council and demanded they do something because the crowd was clearly out of control....people milling around...over three hundred of them...things had gotten crazy with the crowds...without intervention who knows how much they would have swelled. We witnessed an incredible meeting of the city fathers (city council) that lasted only seven minutes....we demanded they do something...call a state of emergency so the state police could be called in...several of the city alderman yelled back: "it's the state's damn fault for dumping all these minorities into Lawrence..."..."it's your fault we have all this scum in the housing projects"..."why don't you pass legislation to keep all these 'spics' from moving here?"...yes, said publically....from the same city council who, to this day, claims there were no racial overtones to the riots..."

Yohe! Camayd-Freixas, MIT Professor of Urban Studies, and consultant coordinating the "Hispanics in Lawrence Symposium" series sponsored by the Department of Social Services states: "Riots among Hispanics are highly unusual...That's why Dukakis saw them as a major problem. Things have got to be extremely serious when rioting breaks out among Hispanics. I see the major problems leading to the riots as related to social disorientation...and dissolution of the Hispanic families who migrated to Lawrence as a function of the economic dependency of their native countries on the United States. They were attracted to the magnet labor economy of the northeast...and they arrived here to find themselves involved in a pattern of social alienation and a truncated economy which inhibits their social mobility. When the awareness of their social situation coincides with

unrest in the community they are prompted to riot."

"The riots?" asks an informant rhetorically. "What else could they mean? This city has denied the Hispanic community has even existed ...not to mention the fact that they (Hispanics) are here with some very serious problems...the riots were a statement...and that statement was a loud cry for help...they (riots) mean the community is hurting....and angry as hell!"

One administrator of a Lawrence-based state agency observes: "...I can only guessthat the Hispanic community does not feel all their needs are being met and so I suppose that's what the riots meant.....they have so many needs in all areas of life.....individual and family stress...economic stress....suffering the stress of just being Hispanic in a city that is still clearly a provincial...and racist city....Maybe the riots were a cry for help...help for all the stress they (Hispanics) experience every day."

Another informant, an administrator of a state human service bureaucracy, states: "The riots could only mean one thing....we are not doing our job. We are a human service agency. They are humans. The two of us are not connected to one another. With all our resources from the state...with all our human services knowledge...with all our good intentions....the riots were a cry from a desperate community."

One government source disagreed when I mentioned some of the responses I had heard so far: "I'll tell you what they (riots) mean. They mean the system is sick....the system that is set up to help people has gotten so busy feeding itself ....that we forgot there were hungry people out there..."

Another government employee, an area director for a state bureaucracy, saw it this way: "I'm not sure what the people involved

in the riots were attempting to do. I think they themselves were unsure and just got caught up in the emotional pitch of the situation. But I do know that the riots brought to everyone's attention how poorly run this city is...and how the economic situation of Hispanics is so bad that it can be considered a real civic crisis."

In other interviews with government sources, the comments included: "The problem causing the riots is jobs;" "It was a race riot pure and simple." "The rioters acted out of hysteria." "The riots had no meaning. People just got crazy." "The riots meant that people cannot be expected to act sanely in a crazy social environment."

One government source summed up many of the themes in this way: "Riots are by their very nature irrational. Rational citizens voice their concerns through governmental channels. But government channels are also irrational. The system is as sick as the people who resort to violence and disorderly conduct. When you ask what the riots mean to me, I can only say that they mean the government and its citizens need a lot of help to cure their respective ills."

### 3.3.2 Community-level interpretations.

"First of all, I don't believe these were really riots at all." claims one unemployed Hispanic resident. "...it was just a neighborhood fight that got out of control...when it got out of control other people wanted to turn it into a demonstration...."

"Drugs is what the riots were really all about," another unemployed Hispanic resident told me. "Anytime you have an area that's a drug scene...it's always a tense situation..something like this breaks out and people rush to the scene.....news spreads like wild fire here...it's a chance to get in and bust some heads for some folks....or

just shout out some of their anger....or a chance to join up...a friend of mine who doesn't live in Tower Hill actually tried to get in past the curfew blockades to try and see how he could get involved in keeping things stirred up...."now's our chance" he told me.... "our chance to band together and make people give us some attention".....sure I joined in....what the hell....I had a few things to get off my chest about the racist (leaders) who run this city...."

An 'identified' leader of the Hispanic community had this to say: "Sure there was a big commotion....but I wouldn't call them riots...they started out as a fight and turned into a demonstration... many of the people who got involved wanted to turn the riots into a demonstration of how these city fathers ...of Lawrence...had better take better care of their children...we pay more respect to our pets than they do to our people...if they don't take better care of their 'children' then some of the children are going to have to take over as city fathers.....that's what's wrong with this city...they call themselves the city fathers and they abuse and neglect their children...."

Another community person, who admits to participating in the riots, observes: "They started out as a fight between two races of people...and then as they started to get bigger...it became a fight between countries... ..Canada...Puerto Rico..and the United States...The Americans were telling the Puerto Ricans to go home where they came from....the Puerto Ricans were yelling at the French Canadians to go home where they came from...and the Americans were yelling "We were here first"....it was crazy....but you could see how ready people were to join in and get things off their chest....things they had thought about for a long time but never let out....that's why

I joined in.....I didn't want to hurt nobody....I wanted to protect people from getting hurt by the cops....or from the other folks....but I couldn't resist getting involved and shout out some of my anger...it felt good...until I got arrested....the way the cops treated the Hispanics in jail was shameful...the whites who were arrested were treated much better...but that's what the riots were all about to begin with..."

Several other community folks I interviewed had these things to say:

- "The riots were just a neighborhood brawl until the police got involved and then they became an official riot;"

- "If you treat people like animals they start acting like animals. The riots are the fault of the city which treats Hispanics like animals;"

- "The riots were part protest, part hysteria, and part street fight...it meant something different to everyone involved.....  
...everybody joined in for some of the same reasons... coming to your people's defense..... but for your own private reasons too....like anger at the system...hatred for people who are different....some just for the hell of it."

One young Hispanic women summed it up this way: "The riots have no meaning...what has meaning is what people are going to do about them."

### 3.4 Action talks.

#### 3.4.0 Preface to action-responses.

In this section we will examine the action-responses that evolved from the above interpretations. We will begin to

appreciate how the meanings attributed to the riots, as indicated by the descriptions of the social problem situation, helped give shape to the corresponding action-responses.

### 3.4.1 Official (intergovernmental) responses.

#### 3.4.1.0 The planning climate.

One state official described the response to the riots in this manner: "The riots hit in Lawrence and the shit hit the fan in Boston!"

Another state official states: "There is no question in my mind that when the riots broke out in Lawrence, Governor Dukakis saw flashes of the national Hispanic vote going down the drain in his presidential or vice presidential bid.....That shouldn't be any surprise if you've been following his career....Dukakis has his eyes on the White House and the last thing he needs is a record of Hispanic rioting in his own state...He's aware of the national population trends...Within a few years...certainly by the time he'd make a presidential bid...the size of the Hispanic voting bloc...particularly if it is joined by the black vote...the rainbow vote...could make or break any candidate....So, although I think he is a committed and concerned chief executive of the Commonwealth...one cannot separate out the political implications of the Lawrence riots on his career....The Governor was in Springfield when the riots broke out.....Before he got back to Boston, the message ran like wildfire through the state bureaucracy....What is your office doing for Hispanics?"

Another state official put it this way: "I can remember that week like it was yesterday.....during a three day period, services to Hispanics became the order of the day..."



One state official put it this way: "On August 8, 1984, the riots in Lower Tower Hill broke out and by August 9th, Hispanics were a top state priority. Suddenly, everywhere a flurry of memos back and forth from one bureau to the next...."What are we doing for Hispanics?"....the Governor wants to know ....and soon!"

Another informant, an employee of a state executive human service agency, states: "You can call them the Lawrence Initiative...but I call them the Lawrence Panic Reaction....we heard the word: riot...and suddenly it came down to what programs and services do Hispanics need....Overnight, millions of dollars and scores of government employees had something to say about what Lawrence needed...."

#### 3.4.1.1 The Legislative Response.

State House Representative Kevin Blanchette explains the legislative bill he introduced within one month of the Lawrence riots: "I sponsored a 5.5 million dollar riot aid legislative bill in the state legislature to help Lawrence by allocating \$3.5 million for social, educational, police, housing, social services, and recreational programs, and an additional \$2 million in bonds to offset public safety costs and damage to public property during the riot."

He referred to his bill as a "hardware and a software approach.... .....the hardware approach deals with making sure the city of Lawrence...particularly the police and fire departments are equipped to handle these emergencies...the software approach deals with getting someone to start talking to people in the neighborhoods and find out about their anxiety and problems, especially the kids...To this day I

hold the City of Lawrence responsible for the escalation of the riots while they occurred and ignoring them and the Hispanic community since they occurred...To this day the city has held no public inquest to examine the meaning of the riots and why they occurred..they have adopted an ostrich mentality...."

Regarding the legislative debate over riot funds, he continues: "We had quite an acrimonious debate on the legislative floor which meant that I had to pull a lot of procedural maneuvers to get them to take up the bill which was being blocked by one legislator for political concerns.....having to do more with infighting for control of the House...and House committee appointments than they did with the real emergency...there were economic concerns, too, relating to his district..... but he also held up the bill because of his unfavorable view toward minorities....."

Curious about these comments I reviewed some of the newspaper articles covering this debate. The legislator cited above, as blocking consideration of the bill, is quoted in a 12 12 84 Boston Globe article as objecting to the measure because: "my community would have to give up (local aid) money." In the same article, it is said that he argued that the Lawrence legislation "goes beyond the (civil) disturbances there." The article claims that he said that he did not think Lawrence's social problems were more severe than other communities. "There's a lot of cities that have a lot of Hispanics, a lot of problems," he is quoted as saying.

Blanchette continues: "What we also asked for was money slated for textbooks, teacher training on cultural sensitivity and awareness, youth and mental health programs, and police and fire equipment and training. These were cut from the original bill."

According to a 2 14 85 article in the Lawrence Eagle-Tribune, "some of the \$2.9 million that was cut from the original riot aid bill will be added to the state budget as separate programs....direct appropriations ...(which) will be acted on in June (1985)."

"We finally got a \$2.6 million dollar riot aid package approved in December of 1984," our fellow traveller continues, "...it provides for \$1 million for disaster relief, repairs to streets and city property...and measures to avoid further trouble.....these include money for police to purchase riot gear and get riot training...the additional amount will go toward improving some of the housing developments, some recreation for the kids, and some money to help the city in its outreach to the community..."

On the issue of riot gear, according to the Lawrence Eagle-Tribune on 12 4 84: "Police Capt. Thomas Nastasia has given Johnson (City Alderman in charge of Public Safety) a three-page list of equipment the department could use. It includes everything from grenades to dog muzzles, at an estimated cost of \$287,927. And that comes to less than half of what Johnson may receive for the Police Department."

The article continues: "Police have said that the equipment used during the August riots was outdated. There were no riot helmets, flak jackets or combat uniforms. Tear gas cannisters expired in 1957 and most of the gas masks were made in 1941." Among other items requested, according to this article, were: "walkie talkies, riot batons, twelve shotguns, ten grenade launchers and more than 200 grenades." And, "other communication equipment, ammunition and riot gear."

When I asked Blanchette about these requests, he confirmed

that the police department had received the equipment and added: "I understand half of the riot batons have already been stolen by the police themselves....they also have a calendar in their bathroom, I understand, and a pool of money predicting the date of the next riots in Lawrence." The latter claim was confirmed to me by one of the Lawrence police officers with whom I spoke who said: "In my opinion, many of the guys on the force can't wait for an opportunity to use the new equipment....at least we're prepared."

Blanchette continues: "(the appropriation) also includes recreation....such as two water spray structures to cool kids off during the hot summer months...ease tensions.....and some handball courts, a basketball court, and improvements to city parks.....it also includes another \$1 million to improve and modernize the Lawrence Housing projects.."

On the matter of housing project improvements, the Mayor of Lawrence, John Buckley, "said rehabilitating public housing should be a top priority, since the stalled improvements to the Merrimack Courts could lead to more frustration" according to a 3\14\85 Lawrence Eagle-Tribune article which goes on to quote the mayor as saying: "That's one of the weak links we have. Public housing has to do something and do it this year."

The article continues: "It's too bad he didn't have that attitude twenty years ago, " responded Lawrence Housing Authority Executive Director Roland D. Hatch. "He presided over the demise of public housing. All we get is finger pointing, but what have they (the City Council) done?"

I mentioned to Blanchette that I had spoken to the Director of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Alex Rodriguez,

who expressed concern about the City of Lawrence's position of civil rights and had threatened to block any state or federal funds to the city.

The legislator agreed that Lawrence was in "a poor position" with regard to compliance with civil rights legislation. "Part of the money, \$200,000 worth, will be spent for improving the city's planning and community outreach....specifically, improving the city's governmental mechanisms including the recently formed Human Relations Commission...improving it by making it more reflective of the racial makeup of the city and by implementing the Citizen Advisory Board which was mandated by the new city charter voted to take effect in the 1985 city elections....I will insist that the riot aid money be contingent on the city moving forward on these programmatic improvements....I will insist, for example, that the city fire the Affirmative Action Officer who is not doing his job....I have also been in contact with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.....I will insist that Lawrence make progress toward updating their Affirmative Action Plan and finally get around to developing a Fair Housing Plan.....but in the long run, the money is only as good as it will be spent.....and I am not optimistic because it is going to the city and they have made no attempt to meet with Hispanic citizens to learn why the riots occurred."

#### 3.4.1.2 The Institutional Response.

In addition to the state legislative action, the Executive Offices of Communities and Development, and, Human Services, through a measure referred to as the Lawrence Initiative introduced a package of health and human services at a cost

of over \$1.4 million dollars. These programs and services included allocations to the existing human service delivery system in Lawrence as well as the existing housing and community development programs. Also included in this Initiative was an allocation of \$33,000. for the development of an "organizational strategy to yield a multi-service center at the service of Lawrence Hispanics." This center, incorporated in February, 1985, as Centro Panamericano will be featured in the final chapter as it relates to the potential for mobilization of the Hispanic community.

#### 3.4.2 Community-level feedback.

Following are some of the stories I collected from community residents in response to my question: "What are your thoughts and feelings about how the state and city have responded to the riots?"

One informant describes the response this way: "To tell you the truth I am afraid the riot hysteria has affected the legislator's judgment...I worked with him on the 'yellow hat brigade'.....the group who tried to do some crowd control during the riot....but seeing what he has done with this riot aid bill.... I think he really got panicked.....he was so interested in the group of us who got together with the Alliance for Peace...he was very helpful....and he turns around and arms the police.....now there's talk he wants to run for mayor....we might as well stick with Buckley...at least he doesn't pretend to like Hispanics.....at least it didn't matter to him the police had outdated equipment to handle riots...."

Another informant responds: "Hardware which includes grenades and shotguns...and software that includes talking to people about their

problems just doesn't make sense when you put them together....it is a sign of a government afraid of its own people, on one hand, and trying to care for them on the other.."

One recent immigrant sees it this way: "I came to the United States to escape this kind of police state.....in our country the minute you see the police prepare for battle.....you know soon there will be more war...there are many of us here trying to escape this ..."

Another Lawrence Hispanic states: "In Boston they tell us they will help the Hispanics in Lawrence. And so, they give police riot gear...since last summer they've swooped in on us....from drug enforcement undercovermen, social workers, the state office of this and the state office of that....I just want to have some dignity, alright? And a job....I haven't heard about either from any of you....it's like somebody let the floodgate down in Boston and here come all you folks with your notebooks and shit...so now that you know about my anxiety and problems...now what are you going to do?....Got a job for me, brother?"

"I think it is insulting that so much argument has gone on about what to do with the riot aid money....the so-called Human Relations Commission is the group deciding on community priorities....have you seen who is on that? Not our leaders! No wonder the police are getting guns and the fire department a new fire truck....there's your hardware.....they are using the word riot to get what the city wants not what the people need...." is how another resident expressed her feelings to me.

Another resident put it this way: "We are talking about helping Hispanics here and the state is giving the police riot gear....is that a double message or what?"

One resident observer laments: "They want to shower down our kids this summer with water to cool them off ....and shoot their parents with shotguns to shut them up if they try to protest again.....Are supposed to feel like the city and the state cares for us just because we going to get a few basketball courts?.....While the police prepare for another riot?...and the fire department can use their new truck to put it out.....it is disgraceful that so much attention is placed on the fear that Hispanics will riot again.....instead they should help us prepare for jobs....help improve our schools....the state should force the city to pay attention to us...or else there will be more riots and this time people could get killed..."

The Reverend Danny'Neill tells me: "the word riot has become the magic word....everybody's using it to get the money...But very few of them have had the decency ...and the wisdom...to ask the Hispanic community what should be done here....they talk about helping us help ourselves...but they want to tell us how all along the way...many of us have tried for years...and we have learned a lot along the way ....one major lesson we have learned is that the community must get itself together, seek its own agenda, with the help of those who support us, and not depend on the city..."

### 3.5 Chapter summary.

In this chapter we have examined the meanings attributed to the riots, and their corresponding action-responses. In the following chapter we will examine to what extent Lawrence is similar to other social protests in other cities, and what are some possible interpretations of the riots in Lawrence.



"INTERPRETATIONS AND RESPONSES"

4.0 Introduction to the chapter:

In this chapter I will begin the discussion by briefly acknowledging the spirit with which I have collected and used stories in this report. Then, I assess the interpretations of the riots and the action-responses that emerged from these 'Rashoman-like' interpretations. My assessments attempt to respond to a set of key questions; key themes which run through the literature on social protest movements. These themes bear directly on the implications of political expressions of social discontent with conditions of inequality; the basis upon which challenges for entry into the political arena have been launched. Also in this chapter, I will relate these themes to two theoretical interpretations of social protest which dominate historical accounts.

4.1 Reflections on a theme.

In the attempt to reflect on the themes of the stories collected here, I am reminded of an article written by Richard Bolan (1) where he reports: "A recent seminar at Boston College brought together a number of protagonists involved in an issue which generated one of the major riots in the ghetto of an eastern city (Newark, New Jersey) in the summer of 1967. Observing these actors was like observing those in the movie: Rashoman. Each perceived and interpreted the same set of facts and circumstances in an entirely different way."

While I make no attempt to resolve this "communication

significant differences and commonalities among the stories I collected. In this regard, I believe the 'communication problem' related to Lawrence might well be addressed by sifting through different interpretations, paying close attention to the social problem descriptions, and identifying themes of commonality. This task requires good, active listening skills and sensitive interpersonal abilities; above all, it takes the willingness to address the communication problem directly by talking to the Rashoman cast of characters at a face-to-face level. Moreover, I believe the locus of the communication problem in Lawrence is not with the fact of various interpretations, as much as it is located in the limited opportunities to participate in the discussion. Because the interpretation of the Lawrence riots "depends on who you talk to," as many informants responded, it is even more critical in planning action-responses that those with whom one talks are those to whom plans refer.

The excerpts I chose from these stories are not offered as 'typical' nor 'methodologically' representative, since these are 'key informants,' and not respondents to a more scientifically-designed research design. Rather, the excerpts I have chosen from the stories I collected, and the interpretations I make of them, are intended to suggest a range of themes which are pertinent to the consideration of the social problem situation in Lawrence. They may be of some potential use to those who would plan with the social problems of Lawrence in mind. Since many of my informants remarked that no one else had asked their impressions, I am less concerned that their stories be variously interpreted, than I am concerned that they may not have been heard at all.

To the extent that planners can depend on these stories, as

contrasted to other sources of information, is a matter beyond the scope and intent of this report, and subject to the questions planners frame for themselves. This attempt has been to offer a 'Rashoman' of interpretations, trusting that a cooperative tendency will emerge among the different versions, suggesting areas of common agreement upon which action-responses can be based.

#### 4.2 The use of qualitative research in realistic planning.

The interview method I employed in gathering these stories has two inspirational sources. One is an article by Lisa Peattie (2) entitled: "Realistic Planning and Qualitative Research" in which she writes: "Planners often fail to recognise that at the bottom they depend on stories of how the World works. They need not notice their dependence on stories of how the World works because they take them for granted -- until for some reason events prove them wrong...." The stories collected here are a conscious attempt on my part to depend on them for a view of how Lawrence works, or doesn't, as a basis also of providing a 'street level' or 'front line' perspective that could be of some use to those who would plan in Lawrence.

Stories collected at a face-to-face, interactive level, as here, can serve a purpose beyond the needs of planners, although one consistent with planners' needs. They serve the basic purpose of helping those to whom plans refer. The very process of collecting these stories serves a valuable and critical educational\political function. The stories help the informants to "name their world;" and by naming it begin to develop an understanding of how to move to transform the world where it does not work, and how to preserve the ways in which the world does work. This educational process, a fundamental political act, is

inspired by the work of Paulo Freire whose writing in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed helped to shape my thoughts on the "planning with" mode of planning which I will advocate in the following chapter.

#### 4.3 Theoretical basis for examining stories.

##### 4.3.0 Two views of protest.

Two distinct theoretical explanations emerge from the historical and contemporary accounts of social protest. One explanation reflects the traditional view of social protest from a collective behavioral approach; emphasizing social protest as the irrational behavior of the 'victims' of social pathology. Their cries and shouts of protest are seen as emotional expressions and are viewed as signals of social strain and of the stresses of social conditions. Predictably, governmental responses to protest seen from this perspective adopt a 'treatment' posture; actions seem intent on treating the emotional symptoms rather than addressing their systemic bases.

The alternative view sets forth a resource management approach. While not discounting the social pathological interpretation, this approach sees social protest as a dimension of historical processes of political participation; more goal-conscious in its orientation, involving consideration and allocation of individual resources to a collective effort. Governmental responses to protest seen in this way address conditions and resources that can facilitate the evolution of protest into more peaceful means of political action.

The interplay of these two distinct views in attempting to explain social protest behavior generates important challenges to the pluralist tradition of explaining democratic ideals as practiced in the

United States. The collective behavior paradigm sees the participants of social protest as human products of social disorganization; acting in a disoriented fashion somewhat 'outside' the political arena; irrational in that 'available' means of political recourse are not considered or utilized.

The resource management perspective views participants as involved in a conscious pattern of "forming and dissolving, mobilizing and demobilizing, formulating and making claims, acting collectively and ceasing to act, gaining and losing power" (3); no more nor less rational than other political actors. This perspective regards the protest activity as a means of attempting to gain entry into the arena and once in, seeking to make the political system responsive to the protestors' claims. The resource management perspective acknowledges the emotional pitch of protest activity, and its contagion effect, but attributes meaning beyond the seemingly witless release of tension regarded in the main by the collective behaviorist theorists.

The implications of these views to the action-responses which emerge from them, particularly on the part of intergovernmental actors and agencies, is relevant to the discussion of the Lawrence riots. Both views are seen as operative; with the collective behaviorial view dominating and the resource perspective assuming a secondary emphasis. In particular, the primary emphasis on programs and services, and on social control measures, will be highlighted as it contrasts to the secondary emphasis of resource allocation for political development; namely, resources for organizational development.

The action-responses of primary emphasis are seen here as predictable intergovernmental responses, particularly in view of how their spokespersons describe social problem situations. The latter

secondary emphasis on political development are seen as the more critical resources necessary for sustained governmental access and responsiveness relative to Lawrence Hispanics; with political development (including the mobilization of group size; white support; political experience and organizational development) seen as the critical channel for the expression of social discontent into concerted social action.

#### 4.3.1 The Collective Behavior View of Social Protest.

A critic of this view, Ronald Aminzade (4), summarizes it for the purposes of contrast with an alternative: "The disrupting effects of large-scale social change, such as migration and urban population growth, involve a breaking apart of social bonds due to the uprooting of persons from traditional communities, which disorients individuals and leads them into disorderly, and sometimes violent, political action. The focus is upon the social disorganization and disintegration produced by the rapid pace of structural change, which leads to deviant behavior....Implied in the model is the mass society notion that the most alienated and disoriented individuals are most likely to join the ranks of the revolution and that collective political violence is essentially an anomic phenomenon" (p.4).

Eric Hoffer (5), one of the earlier prophets of the collective behavior tradition, characterizes the central theme: that participation in collective action of a protest nature is fundamentally irrational. According to Gamson (6). "Hoffer is an extreme representative of the collective behavior tradition; he virtually

ignores the social conditions that produce the behavior he describes. But other more sophisticated proponents still rely on such psychological states as loss of identity and alienation as the intervening mechanisms in their explanations. Even in the more complex versions, people are unaware of what it is that energizes them to act, and their actions are not directed at the underlying conditions that produce the alienation or anxiety."

#### 4.3.2 The Resource Management Perspective.

Ronald Aminzade explains the alternative view as follows: "The resource management model views (social protest) as an extension or continuation, in a particular form, of everyday, nonviolent political activity. An event of collective violence is conceptualized, not as a sudden and unpredictable outburst or eruption of heretofore latent tensions or frustrations which take their manifest form in an organizational vacuum, but rather as the outcome of a continuous process of organizational activity" (p.5).

Anthony Oberschall (7), a proponent of the resource view, states: "In ordinary everyday activity, at work, in family life, and in politics, people manage their resources in complex ways.....resources are constantly being created, consumed, transferred, assembled and reallocated, exchanged or even lost. At any given time, some resources are earmarked for group ends and group use, not just individual use. All these processes can be referred to as "resource management" (p.28).

He continues: "Group conflict in its dynamic aspects can be conceptualized from the point of view of resource management. Mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented group

assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals. Social control refers to the same processes, but from the point of view of the incumbents or the group that is being challenged. Groups locked into conflict are in competition for some of the same resources as each seeks to squeeze more resources from initially uncommitted third parties" (p.28).

Charles Tilly asks the following, in contrast to the collective behavior paradigm, "Why begin an inquiry into collective violence with the presumption that violent politics appear only as a disruption, a deviation, or a last resort? Rather than treating collective violence as an unwholesome deviation from normality, we might do better to ask under what conditions violence disappears from ordinary political life" (p.27).

#### 4.4 The question of meaning.

Many of the interpretations, most notably those of official governmental representatives, primarily adopt the perspective of the collective behavior paradigm. The riots are seen as the acts of "alienated," "disoriented," "crazy," citizens acting out their "hysteria" because "they didn't know what else to do" -- dramatic interpretations of socio-psychological pathology.

However, a secondary emphasis on the 'rational' character of the riotous behavior is also evident. Observers also acknowledge that riot participants acted with a 'political' consciousness and earmarked some of their resources for group ends, that is, they joined in to deliver some group messages: "fed up with lack of access," "cry for help," "needs not being met," and, "anger at the system," to name but a few.



Apart from these interpretations are also those observers who do not attribute any meaning to the riots beyond their being a reaction to the hot weather or of a "hot-blooded" population; interpretations which can be seen as serving a denial and avoidance function of no inconsequential political strategy.

#### 4.4.1 Political expressions?

The mayor of the City of Lawrence, several of the city alderman, and other official observers who insist that the riots were meaningless outbursts share a history with the observers of other riots in other cities. The mayors of New York, Los Angeles, and many other cities which experienced riots in the 1960's also insisted that the riots in their cities were spontaneous events signifying little, except for their common theory about the effects of hot weather. As Fogelson observes: "They have, in effect, denied that the disorders were political expressions, no matter how broadly defined. For these government officials this interpretation is most reassuring; it precludes attempts to blame them for the rioting and also relieves pressures to alleviate long-standing problems in the ...ghettos."

It would appear that the reluctance of the Lawrence 'city fathers' to attribute much political significance to the riots could be an attempt to both avoid responsibility and the complex task of alleviating the plethora of social problems which others clearly see as directly related to the riots. It is this avoidance of the political dimensions of the riots that has brought charges of "an ostrich mentality" by the state legislator, Kevin Blanchette, who "holds the city civilly responsible for the riots" and soundly criticizes

the city for not having held a public inquest into the riots. Others I interviewed hold the city's "denial of the political message of the riots" as untenable; a frequent criticism echoing Blanchette's: that no public inquiry or "dialogue with the citizens" has ensued in the riots' aftermath.

Remarkably, service bureaucrats at the state level, community residents, and local service providers perceived the social and economic conditions of racism; poverty; lack of equal opportunity in employment, education, and housing; discrimination in jobs and services; as the grievances which constituted the 'meaning' of the riots. In particular, relative inequality within these areas was frequently cited as a causal factor. While many observers thought the initial fight which set off the riots was not a "conscious political act" on the part of those initially embattled, there was the observation that as the riots escalated "they took on a political dimension...both in what the rioters were saying to one another...the racial slurs...but also in how the riots were handled, and ignored, by the government officials.." as summed up by one informant.

#### 4.4.2 Lawlessness and disorder?

Several informants, and numerous media accounts of statements made by Lawrence city officials and city residents, perceived the riots as incidents of "lawlessness and disorder." Many comments here reflect the "riff-raff" accounts of riots in other cities, where the riot participants are characterized as the unemployed, ill-educated, and criminal element whose basic disrespect for the law accounts for the disorder. The image here is one of chaos, where the confusion of the riotous events is complete and overwhelming,

leading many to conclude the participants were the "irrational" victims of the "stresses and strains of society," so disoriented as to disregard law and order; as accounted for in the 'collective behavioral' theory of social protest.

But a closer view of the events, as provided by some of my informants, indicate a rationality, with features of restraint and selectivity, that suggest the riots may have a different meaning. The accounts of some participants, who saw the riots as "a chance to band together and make them (city) give us some attention;" and "I sure had a few things to get off my chest about the racist (leaders) who run this city;" or "to protect people from getting hurt," suggest visible individuals and discernible patterns that helped shape the turn of events and their apparent 'meaning.' Indeed, the "yellow hat brigade" of community residents which sought to exercise crowd control evolved with another purpose which was "also to try and channel some of the frustration into other forms of protest where people would not get hurt...that's how the Alliance for Peace emerged from the ranks of some of us who participated in the riot activity..." as one informant describes his participation.

There were also discernible patterns of restraint and selectivity. Accounts from other informants who observed and/or participated in the riots identified a 'selective' response to the police interventions; where state police were not subjected to the hostility expressed against the city police. Although an estimated fifteen homes were the targets of firebombing, and two commercial sites were burned, there is some indication of 'restraint' in that this type of attack against property did not escalate indiscriminately. In fact, numerous informants claim that the owner of one commercial

establishment actually "paid some people to burn his place down for the insurance.." as one participant reported. Other observers claim that when the tavern was looted many of the original fighting factions "actually got together and had a few beers." Some attribute the looting of the tavern as the purposeful and opportunistic act of "drug addicts who saw this as a chance to openly steal to help support their habit." Others saw the burning as an attempt to "burn out the drug dealing," indicating a specific instance of a larger apparent collective thought: that the riots would somehow improve an already deplorable situation.

#### 4.4.3 Racial overtones?

Perhaps the most distinct difference between 'official' and other informants' interpretation of the riots has been around the question of whether the riots can be interpreted as "racially motivated." Again, the dismissal of this highly charged issue on the part of the governing officials may be seen as an attempt to avoid blame or responsibility for the systemic bases of institutionalized racism in city government practices. One news reporter with whom I spoke said this: "I was amazed to hear the racist barrage - comments among the rioters and the total dismissal of racial overtones by city officials....to the trained or untrained eye, the riots clearly expressed racial tensions and a cross-fire of racist hatred."

The informant who claimed the "meaning" of the riots is found in "what people are going to do about it" went on to say: "If the riots were not racially motivated or racist in nature, then you only need to look at what the city and state have done to see racism in

action....since the riots, the public comments of the city council and mayor smack of racism...meanwhile the state has helped equip the city with riot gear to shoot down any further opposition....if the riots had been a protest against the city from the white population, I am sure the response from government would have been substantially different....the racial overtones are on both sides of the riots..."

#### 4.4.4 Hispanic riot?

It is remarkable, too, that the riots were seen primarily as a statement of concern for the social conditions of Hispanics. A few observers have interpreted the riots in terms of class issues, but the prevailing thought seems to regard the problem as a cultural issue between white and Hispanics; hence the several allocations for cross-cultural training of teachers, police, and government employees. Noteworthy has been the lack of attention to the general problems of the poor and immigrant populations, those who are not Hispanic but share many of the same grievances; experiencing the same deplorable conditions as those of the Hispanic poor in Lawrence.

This cultural view seemed to influence the foci of programs and services which were 'targeted' at the Hispanic population, mostly by the state. In turn, the governmental service bureaucracy followed suit by planning for Hispanics as the primary service recipient population. These measures seem to adopt a view of Hispanics as a marginal population. The task then is to "mainstream" them into the general current of life in Lawrence; this has been a dominant metaphor in the planning language relative to the Hispanics' civic status in Lawrence.

Remarkably, the view has been extended to a 'cross-cultural'

perspective predominately in the service delivery sector. Here the state has channelled resources "to train service providers on cross-cultural issues." One example has been the symposia series on "Hispanics in Lawrence" sponsored by the Department of Social Services; which received mixed reviews from informants. One major criticism of the symposia, designed to address cross-cultural issues, was its emphasis on the socio-psycho-pathological characteristics of the Hispanic populations at the apparent disregard of the systemic bases for cross-cultural dilemmas in communication and interaction. As one informant, who attended the four sessions of this series, states: "The meetings were problem-oriented which is good except that the multi-problems they emphasized were those of the Hispanics...they ignored the multi-problems of the state, city, and local services, many of whom are out of touch or resistant to serving the needs of Hispanics....The riots were as problem-oriented an experience as we needed....the need which remains is what the total community is going to do about the problems which are well known?...The symposium missed the mark in the same way the state and city have...by focusing on the problems of Hispanics they have avoided dealing with how the white community have contributed to the problem..and how they must also become part of the solution as much as the Hispanics must solve their own problems..."

One noteworthy effort to address systemic issues has taken the form of a regulatory control measure. The actions taken by the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Alex Rodriguez, to freeze certain federal and state funds into Lawrence until the City of Lawrence makes "substantive progress in the implementation of an Affirmative Action Plan and in the development of

a Fair Housing Plan" represent a specific strategy directed at the systemic source of problems faced by Lawrence Hispanics.

This move has been steadfastly resisted by the city council, and the mayor who recently complained that the Commissioner Rodriguez "is interfering with city business and has no right to tell the city what to do."

One informant comments on this move by Rodriguez: "Finally we have someone who sees the riots not as a Hispanic problem but as an official problem...the Hispanics called attention to 'the' problem..which is a racist and unresponsive city government....instead many people have seen the Hispanics as 'the' problem..."

#### 4.5 The question of purpose.

##### 4.5.0 Riots as purposeful protest.

A common theme among some stories is that the riots had a purpose to them with identifiable audiences and objectives. These themes underscore the resource management perspective and are helpful in appreciating the political dimension of the riots, as well as the consideration of "under what conditions violence disappears from political life," per Tilly.

##### 4.5.1 Audience?

In Lipsky's terms it would appear that the "reference publics" to which the rioters and subsequent intergovernmental and community-level responses have appealed, include the city and state governments, the general public, and the white and Hispanic Lawrence populations.

Examining the riotous behaviors, two identifiable audiences were the racially defined groups which represented the initial locus of

conflict. As our stories indicate, the riots then took on a larger audience as participants became aware of media coverage and of each other's protest agenda. The emergence, for example, of the Alliance for Peace, a grassroots citizen organization which emerged from among the riots' participants and later, their supporters, demonstrates an intent to channel the riot 'message' to a governmental and community audience. Certainly, as time goes on, the awareness of a wider audience of interest may influence the interpretations of the riots' purpose(s). What does seem clear at this point is that the riots are being viewed as a dramatic demonstration of the poor relationship which has existed between the Hispanic population and the local city government in Lawrence.

Examining the various action-responses, it is clear that many programs and services were intended to respond to perceived and expressed needs of the Hispanic community. Others were intended to respond to the identified needs of the governmental agencies, most notably the police department. The legislator's expressed concern about the lack of a dialogue between the city and its residents found its way into support for funding to "improve the community outreach by the city," part of his "software approach." It would appear that the emphasis on the implementation of the city's Human Relations Commission is an appeal to the body politic of Lawrence and the question of pluralist democracy in Lawrence; a measure which indirectly addresses the issue of white response among the city residents and their elected and appointed leaders.

#### 4.5.2 Target?

Again, the initial targets of the riotous activity



were perceived as those most immediately within range: the residents of different racial and cultural identity. As the rioting escalated, the immediate targets became the state and local police; attacks against them led to over 150 arrests of both white and Hispanic residents. The targets of private property were perceived as both an expression of hostility about poor housing, a number of "slumlord-owned housing units" were firebombed; and an expression of opposition to the known "drug-dealing centers of activity" perceived by some riot participants as having been located in the two commercial sites which were burned.

#### 4.5.3 Practices or Principles?

Although many informants denounced the rioters as "lawless" and "interested only in burning and tearing down the system," it would appear that such images do not fit the rioting activity or events which have proceeded from them. First, none of the attacks against property were directed against municipal buildings as might be thought symbolic of attacks against 'the system.' Although many informants claim the number of citizen-owned handguns is quite high, there was no sniper shooting against the police as characteristic of riots in other cities whose pronounced intention was to "Burn, Baby, Burn." If the allegations about the prevalence of citizen owned handguns is true, that no shots were fired on either side indicates a measure of restraint.

Second, as indicated by the emergence of a grassroots citizen organization, the Alliance for Peace, which was itself an outgrowth of the 'yellow hat brigade' which emerged to control the crowds, there is some evidence to suggest that the riots were channelled into an attempt

to deliver a political message. That message carried claims for equality, and for attention by the system to alleviate the social problems that attend the inequality within which Hispanics and other poor people live in Lawrence. These messages were clearly articulated in the prayer vigil conducted by sympathetic, and community-supported, clergy on the evenings of the two nights of rioting. One would imagine that, had the prevailing ideology been to destroy the system, a prayer-oriented peace vigil would have been likewise opposed.

As seems the case with Lawrence, and as has been interpreted of the civil protests of the 1960's, the dominant mood of the riots was not to overturn the system so much as join it as equal partners. As Fogelson concludes about the civil rights protests of an earlier era: "...far from rejecting the prevailing ideology, the rioters demanded that all citizens honor it; they insisted on changes in practices, not principles."

As one informant indicates: "We (Hispanics) are not opposed to America...we are here because we too believe in the freedom and the opportunity that is supposed to be what American democracy is all about...Rather than ask whether Hispanics wanted to tear down the system, you should ask whether the system is keeping its part of the bargain...whether they are practicing democracy or just talking it...."

#### 4.6 The question of intergovernmental processes.

##### 4.6.0 Intergovernmental response.

The resource management perspective is most helpful in appreciating the complexities of the intergovernmental context. In this case, the limited financial resources to support responsive programs and services are seen as a critical resource problem for the

intergovernmental actors, which in turn makes for resource problems at the community level.

In an article by David Walker on "Intergovernmental Response to Urban Riots" (8) he discusses the multi-faceted, multi-level action program which addresses the central problem of intergovernmental issues "which at first glance appear to be far removed from the pathology of a riot." Walker's report on the work of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1968) supports the view by Browning et al that the apparent reason for much of the dissatisfaction of minority groups in cities was (and is still, I believe) rooted in local government structure and fiscal arrangements.

As many of stories in Chapter Two indicate, particularly those of the school system and the housing authority, the conditions in Lawrence, which can be considered as contributory to the potential for social protest, are appreciably understood as an intergovernmental problem.

#### 4.6.1 The city.

As our stories have indicated, many of the City of Lawrence's social problems -- in the areas of education, housing, jobs, and city services, to name a few major ones -- are rooted in a fiscal dependence on the state and federal government. Coupled with an apparent lack of responsiveness to the Lawrence Hispanic community, the Lawrence City Council is faced with social problems not totally accommodated by their local economy.

For example, when the Lawrence Superintendent of Schools laid off teachers and points to a future budgetary needs occasioned by the construction of two new schools, the city council regards the problem

as a primarily a state responsibility. By the same token, the Director of the Housing Authority is concerned whether the riot-initiated funding to improve the housing developments will result in the longer term funding for ongoing programs seen as necessary to sustain satisfactory conditions in the projects -- public safety and security, health, education, and employment programs and services, to name a few.

Within the local service delivery system, the influx of riot-initiated funding has caused considerable concern among many service providers. The competition for funds, the lack of a comprehensive and integrated service delivery area-wide plan, and the low level of intra-agency cooperation and communication, are examples of the concerns expressed by service providers with whom I spoke. One informant summed it up this way: "Well, the shit hit the fan here too. Only it was in the form of money. We too became aware that Hispanics were a service priority and it immediately shifted our attention to specific programming for Hispanics. The rumors of who might compete and what they were planning have been rampant. New organizations are being started by the state to deal specifically with Hispanics was the first word we got...But then we were also encouraged to target more of our services to Hispanics...The whole thing has been very confusing...Where are we going to find bilingual and bicultural staff? And board members? How do we know that next year these funds won't be cut? What about those of us who already provide services to Hispanics...will our service population be undercut by the new multi-service center the state is setting up? What about duplication of services? We are a service network, alright, but you wouldn't believe it lately....you could say our lines of communications are all jammed up....business has

not been the same since the riots...."

#### 4.6.2 The state.

When the state legislator proposed the "riot aid package" he included numerous provisions to improve city programs and services. He and others acknowledge that, without state support and sanction, the City of Lawrence would not move forward in kind. At the state level, however, many of the requests for Lawrence -- primarily for school supplies and teacher training -- were met with opposition by competing claims for these same needs in other cities and towns throughout the Commonwealth.

Noteworthy is the state's support of the office of the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination which has recently "frozen certain state and federal aid for the lack of compliance on the part of the City of Lawrence in two major areas: no progress in Affirmative Action and the absence of a Fair Housing Plan" according to its Commissioner, Alex Rodriguez.

In a similar posture, the state legislative delegation from Lawrence has insisted that the City of Lawrence comply with provisions of a city charter amendment which goes into effect this year, particularly as these provisions have called for the creation of a Human Relations Commission. The Human Relations Commission's recent decision to "eliminate itself and form a leaner and more powerful body to fight discrimination in the city" represents a move of the part of certain Lawrence citizen members on the commission "to establish a systematic mechanism for eliminating unlawful discrimination." At the time of this report, the city council has not taken action on the Commission recommendation; some Hispanic leaders with whom I spoke

indicated the recommendation to establish a "Human Rights Commission" with subpoena power and authorization to formally investigate charges of discrimination "could represent the first substantial step toward Hispanic involvement in city government."

#### 4.6.3 The federal government.

In recent testimony before a federal congressional hearing, Massachusetts's Secretary of Communities and Development, Amy Anthony "pleaded ..with the congressman to fund (Urban Development Action Grant Program - UDAG) at 1985 levels" because: "the future of Lawrence is tied to federal funding." Anthony pointed to the \$6.1 million dollar federal grant issued to GCA Corporation in Lawrence which will generate 1,000 jobs. According to Anthony: "Getting that plant into Lawrence has meant that...over half of the some 1,000 jobs created by this decision are going to the Hispanic population in Lawrence, with special skill training programs being established for these residents by GCA.." This kind of economic development "is not going to happen without a public role that's clear," claims Anthony, who sees the federal government as instrumental in that role. Several state officials I interviewed claimed that Reagan's recent call for the elimination of the UDAG program would have serious negative effects on the ability of the City of Lawrence to provide for the economic development of the Hispanic community.

That Secretary Anthony and other state officials have based arguments on the needs of Hispanic citizens in Lawrence, and related these needs as causal factors of the riots, indicates a resource view of the riots. Arguments for continued federal assistance have been couched in terms of "resources for the Hispanic community which can

create the conditions seen as necessary if future riots are to be averted."

#### 4.7 The question of response.

##### 4.7.0 The Collective Behavior View and the Resource View.

Blanchette's description of a "hardware and software approach" typifies the two views of social protest which are reflected in both the legislative response to the riots and the executive-level response. On one hand, the hardware approach is an allocation of resources aimed at social control through riot equipment and training. This exemplifies the 'resource management view' from the perspective of the challenged party.

By contrast, the software approach includes an array of programs and services of a distinct 'treatment' nature, in keeping with the 'collective behavioral view.' These services adopt the view that the Hispanic community are victims of "alienation" and their behavior in the riots was prompted by a "sense of frustration." Thus, programs are aimed to help relieve the frustration and reduce the stresses and strains of social conditions; as expressed by the "cries of a desperate community."

##### 4.7.1 Social control.

In a review of "Establishment Response" in the aftermath of riots in the United States, Joe Feagin and Harlan Hahn, (9), conclude: "In general, one cannot fail to be impressed more by the scope and intensity of the law enforcement or control response than by the relatively limited character of the social and economic reforms

which came in the aftermath of the rioting." They go on to take issue with Skolnick's (10) assumption that "reform measures have about the same prospect of gaining executive and legislative support as control and firepower measures." Feagin and Hahn conclude: "When faced with crises, urban governments have usually had limited financial (and other) resources at their disposal. The resources that are available will tend to flow into the areas where there is the least resistance -- and strengthening law enforcement capabilities appears to be the most welcome response of governments to crises from the perspective of white powerholding groups."

The allocation of resources for social control, namely the riot gear and training of the local police, was perceived by most community-level observers as the most contentious issue among the intergovernmental responses. Especially in the absence of a concerted effort on the part of city government and local state government to establish a direct dialogue with the Hispanic community, this issue has raised the level of apprehension on the part of many community-level citizens. Additionally, a recent report by the state Criminal Justice Training Council, commissioned in response to the riots, has pointed out "glaring problems" in the police operations which some residents feel will result in "an over-reaction on the part of Lawrence police to flex their muscle and demonstrate their effectiveness through excessive use of force, intervention, and harassment in the Hispanic neighborhoods," as stated by one concerned Hispanic leader who summed up a meeting of concerned Hispanic residents who met to discuss police and community relations.

#### 4.7.2 Treatment.



While it is beyond the scope of this report to detail the specifics of the institutional response by the state and local service bureaucracies, suffice it to say that the nearly two million dollar "Lawrence Initiative" was comprised mostly of program and services of a 'treatment' nature. A smaller percentage, less than 4%, was allocated for organizational development. The bulk of the financial, human, and material resources were allocated to increase the service capacity of the state, city, and privately-run service delivery system, with a particular view toward increased delivery of services to Hispanics.

Many observers agreed with the need for such services but expressed concern that the targetting of these programs and services to the Hispanic population tacitly presumes that the social problems in Lawrence are being sufficiently 'treated.' As one informant claims: "The emphasis on programs and services to treat the sick people, as well as the presentation of facts regarding the relative higher stress which Hispanics experience that has been the central subject addressed at the symposium (the Department of Social Services Symposia series on Hispanics in Lawrence), does nothing more than attempt to take off the rough edges of the social problems. We are not blaming the victim so much as treating him. What remains to be done is rehabilitating the system which perpetuates the social inequality...this is not something the state or city can do...this work must be done by the community...at the ballot-box, and in the meeting rooms, and living rooms where organizations and leaders are developed...."

#### 4.7.3 Resources.

The emphasis up to this point has been on the

allocation and implementation of resources which emanated from within the intergovernmental context. We see how these resources have corresponded to the collective behavioral view of social protest as well as the resource management perspective.

#### 4.8 Chapter summary.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how I have depended on the stories I collected to give meaning to the riots and various action-responses. The discussion attempted to respond to several key questions regarding the riots as a means of painting the backdrop against which planning efforts supporting the mobilization of Lawrence Hispanics will be set.

In the following final chapter, I will generalize the intergovernmental modes of planning -- planning 'at' and planning 'for' -- toward the purpose of advocating a 'planning with' mode within the community context. This mode adopts the resource management perspective of the Hispanic community; particularly with regard to existing and required resources which may indicate the mobilization potential of the community, should it become their collective political will to move toward political incorporation.