
Early Stage Capital: Term Sheets 101

**15.391 Fall 2010
Shari Loessberg**

Team Sign Up

- ▶ Team formation
 - list of members
 - team name
 - Team contact

- ▶ Send schedule availability by email to James:
 - lawyer rounds
 - VC rounds

- ▶ **Deadline: email by 8:00 pm Monday, November 1**

Overview

Mechanics and Industry Trends

Overview: VC Investment Process

- ▶ Step 1: Pitching to Investors: investor high-level due diligence: 2 weeks-2 yrs
- ▶ Step 2: Decision by investor to invest: 2 weeks-4 months
- ▶ Step 3: Term sheet negotiation: 2-4 weeks

Overview:

VC Investment Process

- ▶ Step 4: Financing Documentation:
Lawyer Time: 4-12 weeks
 - ▶ Legal and continuing business “due diligence”
 - ▶ Draft big thick legal docs: Purchase Agreement; Articles of Incorporation; Voting Agreements, etc.
 - ▶ Prepare closing deliverables: legal certificates, government filings, etc.

- ▶ Step 5: Sign and close: **MONEY**

- ▶ Step 6: Additional closings: milestones, tranches, etc.

Venture Investment Trends




Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Source: PWCMoneytree.com 2010

Early vs. Later Rounds




Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Source: PWCmoneytree.com 2010

Term Sheets 101

- ▶ Today's Goal:
 - Get everyone to a low common denominator re term sheet jargon and VC practice
- ▶ No jargon without explanation
- ▶ Questions and Discussion

Term Sheet Basics

“No questions are dumb today”

Term Sheet/VC Resources

- ▶ Endless, rich resources online
- ▶ Hundreds of blogs
- ▶ NVCA model documents
- ▶ PWC Moneytree & law firm statistics
- ▶ TIE, TCN events
- ▶ VC Conference, 100K, VCPE Club,

Term Sheet Definitions

“Term Sheet”

- ▶ guts of the business deal
- ▶ NOT a “legal” document
- ▶ short (~5-8 pages)
- ▶ VC offers its template

Term Sheet Definitions

“Common Stock”

- ▶ what Founders and Employees get
- ▶ has voting rights but not much else
- ▶ very cheap, especially at A round
- ▶ options and restricted stock

Term Sheet Definitions “Preferred Stock”

- ▶ what VCs get
- ▶ “preferred” because it’s got better rights and protections than common stock
- ▶ also costs more than common
- ▶ exact definition of preferences is key focus of negotiation (and this course)

Term Sheet Definitions

“Valuation”

- ▶ “Pre-money”: value before financing

- ▶ “Post-money”: pre-money plus financing

Term Sheet Definitions

“Valuation”

- ▶ VC stake stated as percentage of post-money:
 - ▶ “4 on 6” =
 - ▶ \$6M pre-money with \$4M round =
 - ▶ \$10M post-money; VCs own 40% of the company

Valuation Jargon

- ▶ ***You be the VC:***
- ▶ “5 on 10” =
- ▶ \$_____ M pre with \$ ___ M round =
- ▶ \$_____ M post; VCs own _____%

Valuation Jargon

- ▶ ***You be the VC:***
- ▶ *“5 on 10” =*
- ▶ *\$ 10M pre-money looking for \$ 5 M round =*
- ▶ *\$15 M post; VCs own 33 %*

Valuation Jargon

- ▶ *“5 on 10” =*
- ▶ *\$10 Million pre-money valuation with \$5 Million of investment =*
- ▶ *\$15 Million post-money valuation; VCs own 33% (5/15)*

Control, Ownership & Economic Power

▶ 5 Key Terms to Negotiate:

- ▶ Board of Directors
- ▶ Vesting
- ▶ Option Pool
- ▶ Preferred Stock Perks: Participation
- ▶ Preferred Stock Perks: Anti-Dilution

Board of Directors

- ▶ Governing group of company
- ▶ Approves major strategic decisions
- ▶ Does not have operating role
- ▶ Shareholders elect, often by class vote

Board of Directors

- ▶ Not legally subject to public company regulations like Sarbanes-Oxley
- ▶ Pre-money--usually consists of employees only
- ▶ Post-money--a mix of VCs, employees, outsiders

Board of Directors: *Term Sheet Issues*

- ▶ Composition post-money:
 - *Will investors have majority?*
 - *% VC ownership highly indicative*
 - *4-6 members post A Round*
 - *Aim for “2-2-1”?*
 - *Who is the “1”?*
 - *How chosen?*

Vesting

- ▶ You don't really own the shares you thought you did
- ▶ Legal mechanism: if you quit/get fired, the Company can buy back, *at your cost basis (probably 0)*, some percentage of your stock
- ▶ Typically, stock vests with the passage of time, but big events may accelerate vesting schedule

Vesting

- ▶ Vesting is artificially imposed by a separate contract, and typically is heavily negotiated in first rounds
- ▶ “Vested” stock is yours to keep, forever; Company’s buyback right is only for “unvested” stock
- ▶ Note: Founders are often issued “restricted” stock, which has an analogous feature like vesting

Vesting:

Term Sheet Issues

- ▶ *Term*: ~3-4 years; varies by sector and region
- ▶ *Schedule*: “cliff”; quarterly; monthly
- ▶ *“Upfront”*: getting credit for work previously done—important for founders
- ▶ *“Acceleration”*: extra credit when big things happen: change of control or getting booted if you “don’t work out”

Option Pool

- ▶ Percentage of company's total stock post-money that is reserved to grant to future hires

Option Pool

- ▶ Typical A round: 15-25%
- ▶ Pool always comes out of founders', not VC's, share
- ▶ How complete is your team? Do you have a hiring plan?

Rough Ranges of Option Grants

- ▶ (i) CEO – 5% to 10%; 5.40% avg.
- ▶ (ii) COO – 2% to 4%; 2.58% avg.
- ▶ (iii) CTO – 2% to 4%; 1.19% avg.
- ▶ (iv) CFO – 1% to 2%; 1.01% avg.
- ▶ (v) VP Engineering – .5% to 1.5%; 1.32% avg.
- ▶ (vi) Director – .4% to 1%

Source: CompStat

Option Pool

- ▶ Typical “Cap Table” post-money:

Series A Preferred:	
VC 1	35%
VC 2	15%
total:	50%
Common:	
Founders	30%
Option Pool	20%
total:	50%

Option Pool

- ▶ Typical “Cap Table” post-money:

Series A Preferred:	
VC 1	35%
VC 2	15%
total:	50%
Common:	
<i>Founders</i>	<i>30%</i>
Option Pool	20%
total:	50%

Option Pool: *Term Sheet Issues*

- ▶ Use the hiring plan to minimize
- ▶ Argue for smaller pool now and wait for a “recharge” --when dilution affects VCs as well
- ▶ Pool is necessity; don't cheap out. What's the right percentage for your stage?

Preferred Stock Perks: Participation

- ▶ Certain rights that VC's stock gets upon "liquidation" (M&A; sale of assets)
 - ▶ 1. "Liquidation preference": VCs get 100% of original money back before Common gets one penny
 - ▶ 2. "Participating preferred" permits VCs to share the leftovers "pro rata" with Common
- ▶ Irrelevant in grand slam; matters only in middling or lousy outcome

Participating Preferred Example

- ▶ Co. raises \$50 on \$50.
- ▶ VC takes standard participating preferred.
- ▶ Co. is acquired for \$200 two years later.

Participating Preferred

- ▶ Co. has \$50 pre-money valuation
- ▶ VC puts in \$50
- ▶ Co. has \$100 post-money valuation
- ▶ VC owns 50% (5/10)
- ▶ 2 years later, Co. sold for \$200...

Participating Preferred

- ▶ **Starting with \$200 proceeds:**

- ▶ **VC gets--**

- ▶ \$50 back right off the top (liquidation preference),

plus

- ▶ \$75 = 50% of \$150 (VC's percentage ownership of leftover assets: participation perk)
 - ▶ **\$125 total (62.5% of Co. value, *although* only 50% Co. ownership)**

Participating Preferred

▶ **Starting with \$200 proceeds:**

▶ **Common is left with--**

▶ \$200

50 (“VC’s preference”)

 - 75 (“VC’s participation”)

▶ **\$75 total (37.5% of Co. value, *despite***

50% of Co. ownership. . .

**and having done all the work to create the
value . . .)**



Participating Preferred

In sum, the power of Participating Preferred cushions VCs with “juiced” returns:

VCs get:

\$125 total

**62.5% of Co. value,
although
only 50% Co.
ownership**

Common gets:

\$75 total

**37.5% of Co. value,
despite
50% Co.
ownership**

Preferred Stock Perks: Participation

- ▶ “Participating Preferred” variants:
 - ▶ None: Investors get no “double dip;” only their liquidation preference: “straight preferred”
 - ▶ Multiple Liquidation Participating Preferred: Rare but very nasty; usually later rounds
 - ▶ Full Participation: Investors share PRO RATA with Common, without limit
 - ▶ Capped Participation: Investors share Pro Rata with Common but only UNTIL ~2-5X return received

Preferred Stock Perks: Multiple Liquidation Participation

- ▶ Uncommon, brutally unfair
- ▶ Devastating in middling and poor outcomes
- ▶ VCs take a **multiple** of their liquidation preference out before Common has a chance to see a penny
- ▶ In 5 on 5 example, with 3X MLP and \$20M exit:
 - ▶ VCs get \$15 back(3 x 5), off the top
 - ▶ Then share 50% of remaining 5M –
 - ▶ That is, \$17.5M to them
 - ▶ \$2.5 M to Common
 - ▶ Even though each class owns 50%

Preferred Stock Perks: Convertibility

- ▶ Preferred stock will always be convertible, at the investor's option, into common stock
- ▶ Initial conversion ratio is 1:1; will change over time
- ▶ Standard

Capped Participating Preferred

Assume \$5M preferred investment for 50% of Company

Sale of Company @	No Cap	3X Cap	Convert to Common	VC's Choice if capped
\$12M	\$8.5M (5 + 3.5)	\$8.5M* (5 + 3.5)	\$6M	Preferred
\$40M	\$22.5M (5 + 17.5)	\$20M (5 + 15)	\$20M	Indifferent
\$41M	\$23M (5 + 18)	\$20M (5 + 15)	\$20.5M	Convert
\$225M	\$115M (5 + 110)	\$20M (5 + 15)	\$112.5M	Convert
\$1005M	\$505M (5 + 500)	\$20M (5 + 15)	\$502.5M	Convert

Participating Preferred

- ▶ VCs never give up their right to participate in upside
- ▶ Currently, used in about ~50% of deals
- ▶ Through the conversion feature, VCs will always have alternative forms of payout, guaranteeing them (at least) the better of:
 - a straight liquidation preference or
 - pro rata share on as-converted basis

Participating Preferred *Term Sheet Issues:*

- ▶ Can you “push back on” the participating and get it out altogether?
- ▶ Can you get a “cap” on the participation feature?

Other Terms that Matter

- ▶ Protective provisions
 - ▶ Founder reps
 - ▶ Tranched investment
 - ▶ No-shop provisions
-
- ▶ *You will take these up in Tuesday's class and in your lawyer rounds*

Term Sheet Subtext

- ▶ It's all about the relationships:
 - ▶ Between VC and founders
 - ▶ Between VC and its LPs
 - ▶ Between VCs within syndicate

- ▶ Trust and comfort level are surprisingly big drivers

Just the beginning . . .

- ▶ Conversion Rights
- ▶ Redemption Rights
- ▶ Pay to Play provisions
- ▶ Redemption Rights
- ▶ Dividends
- ▶ Rights of First Refusal
- ▶ Information Rights
- ▶ Piggyback Registration Rights
- ▶ Drag-Along Rights
- ▶ Tag-Along Rights

. . . This is what lawyers are for--

Preferred Stock Perks: Anti-Dilution Protection

- ▶ VC's protection in event of “down round” so that A Round investors' “conversion ratio” is equal to subsequent investors'.

Anti-Dilution Protection

- ▶ 2 flavors: “full ratchet” and “weighted average.”
- ▶ *Full Ratchet*: draconian; “if only one new share is issued” in B round, all A round investors entitled to B round’s conversion ratio. iow, A round is effectively repriced to B round’s (lower) price. Rare today.

Anti-Dilution Protection

- ▶ *Weighted Average*: Less harsh; takes into account the true dilutive effect of the subsequent down round.
 - broad-based (founder friendly)
 - narrow-based (almost like full ratchet)

Weighted Average is standard today

Anti-Dilution Protection

Term Sheet Issues:

- ▶ Can you get VC to agree to broad-based, weighted average anti-dilution?
- ▶ Can you get VC to take out full ratchet after B round? After hitting targets?

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