

17.584, Civil-Military Relations, Spring 2003  
Prof. Roger Petersen  
**Lecture 8: Latin America II**

**Week 8 Reading Summaries**

A. Loveman, Brian, "Protected Democracies: Antipolitics and the Political Transitions in Latin America", in Loveman, Brian and Thomas Davies, Jr., eds., *The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), pp. 366-423. ISBN: 0842026118.

How the military ruled by extra-constitutional institutional acts, the urban guerilla movement, and how the military opened up to civilian elites up to 1985.

B. Valenzuela, Samuel, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring et al, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57-104. ISBN: 0268012113.

Transition focuses on consolidating democracy, but we should not cyclically define this by stability because a poorly functioning democracy may be the most stable post-authoritarianism. Use minimal definition of a democracy. A consolidated one must not have its authority undermined by tutelary powers (Kings of old, military recently). Typical ways to limit authority of elected leaders is with clauses that the army is a guarantor of the state, protecting realms of policy from control of elected leaders or discriminations in elections process or non-electoral means of establishing governments (which if successful are self reinforcing → perverse institutionalization). Virtuous institutionalization: actors develop capacity to advance their goals in a democratic setting.

60s-70s-democratic consolidation is essentially the process of removing such limitations. Typology of cases: limited liberalization, collapse/withdrawal, extrication, reform.

Re-democratization is easier but useful for all sides to be able to invoke common memories of symbols, or else it may be necessary for some or all parties to reject some of their past. Eg: Spain left repudiated the anticlericalism of the second republic. Civil-military, how civilian government must retain oversight constitutionally and in practice how civilians must renounce the appeal to the military for help in politics and how if military has not reformed with collapse of regime, how critical are the first few years in defeating coup attempts (Spain).

C. Hunter, Wendy, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). ISBN: 0807846201.

It's puzzling that Brazil moved towards a democracy firmly since in the mid 80s despite what analysts had pessimistically predicted about the military's influence. Historical institutionalist perspective of the sticky institutions vs. her rational choice explanation: Politicians are likely to undermine military because of the need to dole out patronage (vs. military budget) and support popular policies. Because the military image of respect for public wishes (some civilian support but the military hesitates to confront civilian government except when they are threatened by

persecution for human rights violations (Argentina, Chile, 1979 amnesty self-granted in Brazil).

The problem with patronage democracy with weak parties like Brazil is that there are strong incentives for civilians not to co-opt the military but also weak institutional arrangement to set up good control of military/oversight. Case studies with budgets (decrease since '85), civil-military conflict over development of Amazon. Labor rights, limiting military prerogatives. (partly successful). Military still controls its education, defense policy, some internal role and interferes in politics. Regionally the pattern is the same, decline of military role in Chile, Argentina with only exception of Fujimori period in Peru.

**Lecture:**

We talked about the war in Iraq and the creeping criticism of how much force should be sent. Donald Rumsfeld's method (shock and awe bombing concurrent with speedy invasion) seems to go against Colin Powell's doctrine (overwhelming force, support of American people, clear exist strategy-quick war). Or is the Army putting its bureaucratic interest in armor ahead and Rumsfeld is right? US technological advantage in firepower, range, night vision is decisive.

Petersen: this is about to demonstrate that the US has the technology to pursue regime change policies with low cost (both in terms of American lives and target society).

Student claim: last year's game exercise of Iraq invasion stopped because an officer in command of mock Iraqis used tactics (eg: suicide boat attacks to stop seaborne invasion) that the general staff didn't want to consider.

Petersen: Bush seems to be following Cohen's advice, decided on assassination attempt of opening of war and timing of war.

Assassination of Djinjic: Probably head of special forcers were behind him. Legia Djinjic was ready to issue warrant for his arrest. He had agreed not to prosecute him in exchange for cooperation in removing Milosevic, but then removed him. Legion invasion with Zemun mafia. Equilibrium upset by Western pressure. Carla del Ponte list of 200. 50 of them were members of the red berets (special forces) extradite or else aid was cut off. Djinjic had had problems with the red berets after he asked them to arrest 2 people who were sent to Hague. Tried to rely on regime military and police. Now martial with popular support, 3,000 arrests, red berets indicted. Their headquarters turned into a police training center. Can't fire on them because it is a crime. Turn them into police? Similar questions regarding post-war Iraq.

In Germany case, Waffen SS kept out of the Federal Army but only the highest officials were prosecuted in high profile Nuremberg trails. Now international trend to prosecute down to individual sometimes.

Latin America-Wendy Hunter book:

Relied with Stepan book. Stepan: military decided the cost of oppression was too high and decided to liberalize but not really democratize. Hunter: the institutions the military has set up to keep power were eroded.

Rational choice framework: People are rational actors with transitive ordered preferences and rational belief formation (no psychological bias).

Hunter: actors are the politicians: president and legislators. Brazil voting system: open-list Proportional Representation (PR) vote for party that issues list but also can choose individual candidates you want to go to parliament. Personalizes politics vs. closed list where the whole party decides → weak parties. (unfortunately, pull class into a couple discussion of size of constituency also matters because if it's a small party they can't afford to pull popular people high on the list with closed list too, etc.

Prof. Petersen shows a diagram that shows the fragmentation into small parties and a lot of people switch parties. It's the right of the candidate to be on the next ballot, TV time for all.

Path dependence decision at critical point constrains the future course. Hunter is against the idea of firm path dependence.

As Stepan thought of military intelligence.

Student: sounds like she thinks that this system of elections is self-reinforcing and no easy return to military government or set up of strong parties that constrain individual politicians. P. 70, summary of points.

Critique:

Maybe it is the military didn't want to intervene. In comparison with Latin American countries may point to rising international norm. Competing hypotheses not considered suggestive talk about Valenzuela. Better reading, longer issues. Southern Europe and Latin American leftist governments, coups military rule, then civilian transition. Politics changed afterwards, less confrontational. Need larger story. Was it the military institutions (electoral in Brazil) or social origins of officers that mattered?