

## **Kripke *Naming and Necessity***

### **Lecture I, Part I**

1. Before Kripke, it was generally taken for granted that necessary truths coincided with a priori truths. How, according to Kripke, can there be necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths? Does he make a plausible case for the existence of both kinds of truths? (Is it clear what it means to say that something is a priori true? And what is the something that is said to be a priori true?)

2. What is the distinction between modality *de dicto* and *de re*? What are Quine and others' objections to the latter? How does Kripke respond? What is the relation between *de re* modal claims, Kripke's discussion of the nature of possible worlds, identity across possible worlds, and the thesis that names are rigid designators?

### **Lecture I, Part II**

1. There are six theses stated at the beginning of Lecture II that together constitute the description theory that Kripke is criticizing. One of them is dismissed early in the discussion, and most of the criticism is directed at a version of the description theory defined by the first five theses. Does Kripke make a persuasive case for rejecting this version of the theory?

2. Here are three related but different questions: (1) Can identity statements be contingently true? (2) Can identity statements containing no referring expressions other than proper names be contingently true? (3) Could there be things *x* and *y* that were related by the identity relation, but only contingently? (We will want to consider the relations between these questions, and more generally between semantic and metaphysical questions.)

### **Lecture II**

1. "My own view, on the other hand, regards Mill as more-or-less right about 'singular names', but wrong about 'general' names." Please explain.

2. Assess Kripke's reply to the objection that, since this table evidently could have turned out to have been made of ice, it can't be a necessary truth that this table is not made of ice.

3. We have discovered empirically that all the samples of water hereabouts are samples of H<sub>2</sub>O. How can we conclude from this that it is not possible for there to be a sample of water that is not a sample of H<sub>2</sub>O?

4. Assess Kripke's objection to the type-type identity theory.

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