

Kripkenstein Questions

1. On p. 8, Kripke says that I may be confident that my answer '125' is correct in both the *arithmetical* sense and the *metalinguistic* sense. What are these two senses? What is their relation to each other and to Kripke/Wittgenstein's project?
2. On p. 11, what are the two forms the skeptic's challenge takes, and the two conditions that Kripke says an answer must meet? Are these reasonable challenges? What would be the upshot if we failed to meet either one of the conditions?
3. What is the *dispositionalist* proposal? What are Kripke's objections to it? Could a more sophisticated version of the account fare any better?
4. On p. 37 Kripke insists that the relation between meaning facts and my behavior is *normative* rather than *descriptive*. What does this normativity amount to? In what sense is it true that I *ought* to answer '125' when given the problem '57+68'?
5. 'Let no one—under the influence of too much philosophy of science...' What is the proposal here and why does Kripke think it's a non-starter? Is it?

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