



# **Safety, Reliability, Certification, Maintenance**


**Prof. R. John Hansman**

*MIT International Center for Air Transportation*

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# Accident Rates and Fatalities by Year

Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1959 Through 2001







Figure by MIT OCW. Adapted from: Aviation Week 10/02.

# Accident Rates by Airplane Type

## Hull Loss Accidents — Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1959 Through 2001




\*\* The Comet, CV-880/990, Caravelle, Mercure, Trident & VC-10 are no longer in commercial service, and are combined in the "Not Flying" bar.

\* These types have accumulated fewer than 1 million departures.


# Accidents by Primary Cause\*

Hull Loss Accidents — Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1992 Through 2001



# Fatalities by Accident Categories



Fatal Accidents — Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1992 Through 2001






# Hostile Actions

## Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1982 Through 2001



# Accidents and Onboard Fatalities by Phase of Flight


Hull Loss and/or Fatal Accidents — Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet — 1992 through 2001





# Accident Rates by Years Following Introduction

Hull Loss and/or Fatal Accidents – Worldwide Commercial Fleet – 1959 Through 2001





# Safety

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- **Safety Targets/Standards**

- |   |             |              |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Carrier      | FAR Part 25 | FAR Part 121 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Civil General Aviation | FAR Part 23 | FAR Part 91  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Military               | Mil Spec    |              |

- **Safety Components**

- Vehicle Airworthiness
- Training and Operating Procedures
- Maintenance
- Culture
  - ◆ Quality Management Processes
  - ◆ Incident Reporting
  - ◆ Accident Investigation
- Liability

- **Design Philosophy**

- Fail Safe
  - Fail Operational
-



# Certification

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- **Civil**
    - Certificate of Airworthiness (i.e. Certification)
      - ◆ Guarantee to the public that the aircraft is airworthy to some standard
    - Operational Approval
      - ◆ Operating Certificate
        - ↓ Equipment
        - ↓ Procedures
        - ↓ Training
  - **Military**
    - Procurement
  - **Space**
    - Man Rated
-



# Certification

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- **Aircraft Certificate of Airworthiness**
    - Standard Type Certificate (STC)
    - Categories
      - ◆ Air Carrier
      - ◆ Normal
      - ◆ Utility
      - ◆ Experimental
      - ◆ Rotorcraft
      - ◆ LTA
      - ◆ Others
-



## Certification

- 
- **Component Certificate of Airworthiness**
    - Engines
    - Propellers
    - Parts
    - Instruments
  - **Component (Parts & Instruments) Standards**
    - Technical Service Order (TSO)
    - Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS)
  - **Software Standards**
    - RTCA DO-178B
  - **Continued Airworthiness**
    - Inspections
    - Maintenance
-





## Federal Aviation Regulations

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- Part 1 - DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
- Part 11 - GENERAL RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
- Part 21 - CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS
- Part 23 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL, UTILITY, ACROBATIC, AND COMMUTER CATEGORY AIRPLANES
- Part 25 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
- Part 27 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
- Part 29 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
- Part 31 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: MANNED FREE BALLOONS
- Part 33 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES
- Part 34 - FUEL VENTING AND EXHAUST EMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR TURBINE ENGINE POWERED AIRPLANES
- Part 35 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: PROPELLERS
- Part 36 - NOISE STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT TYPE AND AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION

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- [http://www.faa.gov/regulations\\_policies/](http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/)




Figure by MIT OCW.



# Safety Analysis

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- **Advisory Circular AC 25.1309-1A**
    - System Design and Analysis
  - **Fail Safe**
  - **Fail Operational**
  - **Preliminary Hazard Analysis**
  - **Functional Hazard Assessment**
  - **Depth of Analysis Flowchart**
    - Complex System
-



# Probability vs. Consequences Graph

|                             |          |            |                      |
|-----------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------|
| Catastrophic Accident       | Red      | Red        | Yellow               |
| Adverse Effect On Occupants | Red      | Yellow     | Yellow               |
| Airplane Damage             | Red      | Yellow     | Green                |
| Emergency Procedures        | Yellow   | Green      | Green                |
| Abnormal Procedures         | Yellow   | Green      | Green                |
| Nuisance                    | Green    | Green      | Green                |
| Normal                      | Green    | Green      | Green                |
|                             | Probable | Improbable | Extremely Improbable |



# Descriptive Probabilities

Probability  
(per unit of exposure)

|       | FAR                  | JAR                  |
|-------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1     |                      | Frequent             |
| 10E-3 | Probable             | Reasonably Probable  |
| 10E-5 |                      | Remote               |
| 10E-7 | Improbable           | Extremely Remote     |
| 10E-9 | Extremely Improbable | Extremely Improbable |

What is the correct unit of exposure : Flight hour, Departure, Failure






# Safety Analysis

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
- **Preliminary Hazard Analysis**
  - **Fault Tree Analysis**
    - Top Down Search - Presumes Hazards Known
    - System Definition
    - Fault Tree Construction
    - Qualitative Analysis
    - Quantitative Analysis
  - **Event Tree Analysis**
    - Bottom Up “Forward” Search - Identifies possible outcomes
  - **Failure Modes and Effects Analysis**
    - Probabilistic “Forward” Search
    - Requires Failure Probability Estimates
    - Requires Assumed Failures from PHA or Historical Data
    - “Target Level of Safety”
-

### A Reduced Event Tree for A Loss of Coolant Accident



Event Tree Example  
From : Leveson


## Fault Tree and Event Tree Examples From : Leveson





# Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

## FMEA FOR A SYSTEM OF TWO AMPLIFIERS IN PARALLEL



| Critical | Failure probability | Failure mode | Failures by mode (%) | Effects            |             |
|----------|---------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------|
|          |                     |              |                      | Critical           | Noncritical |
| A        | $1 \times 10^{-3}$  | Open         | 90                   |                    | x           |
|          |                     | Short        | 5                    | $5 \times 10^{-5}$ |             |
|          |                     | Other        | 5                    | $5 \times 10^{-5}$ |             |
| B        | $1 \times 10^{-3}$  | Open         | 90                   |                    | x           |
|          |                     | Short        | 5                    | $5 \times 10^{-5}$ |             |
|          |                     | Other        | 5                    | $5 \times 10^{-5}$ |             |

Figure by MIT OCW. Adapted from: Leveson.




# Reliability Architectures

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- **Analysis Values often of Questionable Integrity**
  - **Drives Failure Mitigation Approaches**
  - **Avoid Single String Failure**
    - Cannot guarantee  $10E-9$
  - **Redundancy**
    - Dual Redundant for Passive Failures
      - ◆ e.g. Wing Spar
    - Triple Redundancy for Active Systems
      - ◆ 777 Fly By Wire
        - ↓ Sensors
        - ↓ Processors
        - ↓ Actuators
        - ↓ Data Bus
      - ◆ A320 Reliability Architecture by Comparison
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# B777 Avionics Architecture






# A330 A340

## Fly-by-wire - control surfaces

Electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated



Identical for the A340

\*Rudder & Horizontal stabilizer have back-up mechanical control



## ***Fly-by-wire*** □ ***A330/A340*** □

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
- Flight Control computers are dual channel
    - one for control and one for monitoring
  - Each processor has a different vendor for hardware & software
    - software for each processor coded in a different language
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# FBW-A330/A340 flight control architecture

ICAT

Computer / hydraulic actuator arrangement






## **Additional Issues**


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- **Conventional vs. New Technologies/Configurations**
  - **Problem with Software and Complex Systems**
  - **Emergent Behavior**
  - **Air-Ground Coupling Issues**
-





# FAA 8040.4 Safety Analysis Process





# Operational Reliability

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- **MTBF**
    - Mean Time Between Failure
  - **MTBUR**
    - Mean Time Between Unscheduled Replacement
  - **Dispatch Reliability**
    - Conditional Airworthiness
    - Minimum Equipment List
  
  - **Relates to Life Cycle Costs**
-



# Maintenance

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- **Scheduled Maintenance**

- Periodic (e.g. Annual)
- On Time (Time Between Overhaul) (TBO)
- Progressive (Inspection Based e.g. Cracks)
- Conditional (Monitoring Based e.g. Engines - ACARS)
- Heavy Maintenance Checks

- **Unscheduled**

- "Squawks" = Reported Anomalies
    - ◆ Logbook Entries (ACARS)
  - Line Replacement Units (LRU)
  - Parts Inventory
    - ◆ F16 Tail
    - ◆ Glass Cockpits
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## Logbook Entries

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- Pilot: Test flight OK, except autoland very rough.
  - *Mechanic: Autoland not installed on this aircraft.*
  - Pilot: No. 2 propeller seeping prop fluid.
  - *Mechanic: No. 2 propeller seepage normal. Nos. 1, 3 and 4 propellers lack normal seepage.*
  - Pilot: Something loose in cockpit.
  - *Mechanic: Something tightened in cockpit.*
  - Pilot: Autopilot in altitude-hold mode produces a 200-fpm descent.
  - *Mechanic: Cannot reproduce problem on ground.*
  - Pilot: DME volume unbelievably loud.
  - *Mechanic: DME volume set to more believable level.*
  - Pilot: Friction locks cause throttle levers to stick.
  - *Mechanic: That's what they're there for!*
  - Pilot: IFF inoperative.
  - *Mechanic: IFF always inoperative in OFF mode.*
  - Pilot: Suspected crack in windscreen.
  - *Mechanic: Suspect you're right.*
  - Pilot: Number 3 engine missing.
  - *Mechanic: Engine found on right wing after brief search.*
  - Pilot: Aircraft handles funny.
  - *Mechanic: Aircraft warned to straighten up, fly right, and be serious.*
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## Typical Check Cycles

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- **Ramp-check** before every flight
  - **A-check** is done every 350-650 hours and includes more detailed check of electronics and systems as well as a cabin/haul check
  - **B-check** is done every 5 month (1000 hours) and is basically an extended A-check.
  - **C-check** is a detailed inspection of the aircraft's structure as well as systems carried out every 8-18 month according to cycles/flying time etc.
  - **IL-check** is made every 48 month and include detailed inspection and service of structure, wings etc. as well as very extensive tests and service carried out on electronics, hydraulics etc. Recommended improvements are also done.
  - **D-check** is almost a total dismantle and rebuilding of the aircraft. Almost every part is checked. D-check is made every 72 month.
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# Airworthiness Directives

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- **Airworthiness Directives**
  - Based on identified hazards
  - Time to compliance
- **Service Bulletins**



## Servicing

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- **Fueling**
  - **Loading**
    - Payload
    - Stores
  - **Servicing**
    - Food
    - Water
    - Oxygen
    - Oil
    - Hydraulics
    - Air
  - **Cleaning**
  - **Arming**
-



## Transition training / CCQ

